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SARBANES-OXLEY 307: TRUSTED COUNSELORS OR INFORMERS?
M. PETER MOSER* & STANLEY KELLER**
'N this paper we review Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(the "Act")1 and rules the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
or the "Commission") has adopted or proposed to govern the professional
conduct of lawyers who appear and practice before the Commission. The
up-the-ladder reporting and permissive reporting-out provisions in the Fi-
nal Rules adopted by the SEC are seen as having a beneficial impact, in
part because they are generally consistent with prevailing state ethics stan-
dards. Our main thesis is, however, that those proposed rules still under
consideration, which would mandate lawyers to withdraw from represent-
ing issuers followed by either the lawyer or the company reporting outside
the company, should not be adopted, at least for now. Those rules
threaten to change the role of lawyers who advise public companies on
securities matters from trusted counselors to informers. Inevitably, public
companies would be impeded from obtaining legal advice when it is most
needed. Lawyers' ability to promote client legal compliance also would be
jeopardized. Most significantly, the rules tend to shift corporate decision-
making from the directors, who are charged with corporate governance
responsibility, to the company's lawyers.
2
* Mr. Moser, Of Counsel to Piper Rudnick LLP in Baltimore, serves as Chair
of the ABA Task Force on Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the
"ABA 307 Task Force"). He has also served as Chair of the Maryland State Ethics
Commission, the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission and the ABA Ethics
Committee and as an Adviser to the ALI Law Governing Lawyers Restatement
project. He received an A.B. from The Citadel and an LL.B. from Harvard Law
School.
** Mr. Keller, a partner in Palmer & Dodge LLP in Boston, until recently
served as Chair of the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, is a
liaison to the ABA 307 Task Force and was a Special Adviser to the ABA Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility. He received an A.B. from Columbia University and
an LL.B. from Harvard Law School.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2. See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association,
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm [hereinafter ABA Letter of
Dec. 18, 2002] (commenting on originally proposed Part 205 Rules and, among
other suggestions, urging that mandatory noisy withdrawal provisions not be
adopted or, alternatively, be accorded extended comment period); see also Letter
from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association, to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Apr. 2, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/aba040203.htm [hereinafter ABA Letter of Apr. 2, 2003] (urg-
ing against adopting mandatory withdrawal proposals requiring either noisy with-
drawal by lawyer or company reporting lawyer's withdrawal because changes
already adopted should prove effective so that adverse consequences of mandatory
withdrawal and reporting out are unwarranted).
(833)
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In Part I we summarize the purposes and major provisions of Section
307 of the Act. We demonstrate in Part II how the SEC's Final Rules, in
force since August 2003, should, with clarifications, prove acceptable and
effective in achieving the purposes of the Act. In contrast, in Parts III and
IV we describe why we believe that the mandatory withdrawal and report-
ing-out rules the SEC is still considering would be more likely to harm
than protect companies and their investors from management fraud, and
hence undercut the purposes of the Act. In Part V we discuss several chal-
lenges to the Commission's authority under Section 307 to adopt regula-
tions that would override state rules prohibiting disclosure of client
confidences. Finally, in Part VI we propose an appropriate regulatory re-
sponse regarding the mandatory withdrawal and reporting-out proposals.
I. ENACTMENT OF SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 307
As is well known, early in 2002, public attention focused on the enor-
mous losses that investors, employees and pensioners were experiencing as
a consequence of widespread accounting irregularities and flagrant man-
agement misconduct involving numerous public companies. One of the
questions persistently asked has been why the lawyers who represented
these companies and handled their transactions did not question manage-
ment's conduct and the propriety of the transactions that have garnered
notoriety. 3 Following revelation of these accounting irregularities and in-
stances of mismanagement, a practically unanimous Congress adopted the
3. See Allison Frankel, No Confidence, Am. LAw., Dec. 2002, at 78, 102 (ques-
tioning whether allegedly fraudulent deals would not have happened if Enron's
outside counsel had asked more questions about deals they documented); see also
In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 598-611
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (discussing duty of attorneys to disclose nonmisleading informa-
tion to nonclients and third parties, and concluding that attorneys have estab-
lished duty to third parties not to make material misrepresentations on which
attorney knows or has reason to expect that third parties will rely); In re Global
Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 726, 739 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that Global Cross-
ing consulted with its legal counsel prior to entering into amendment of its
Purchase Agreement); SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., Litig. Release No. 18044 (Mar.
20, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8044.htm (de-
claring that HealthSouth overstated its earnings to meet Wall Street's earning ex-
pectations); SEC v. WorldCom Inc., Litig. Release No. 17866 (Nov. 26, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17866.htm (announcing
permanent injunction entered against WorldCom and noting investigation into
adequacy of WorldCom's code of ethics and business conduct and WorldCom's
safeguards to prevent violations of federal securities laws); Floyd Norris, In U.S.
Eyes, a Notably Bold Case of Health Care Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at C4 (not-
ing that lawyer for Richard Scrushy, HealthSouth officer alleged to have directed
accounting fraud, was "shocked and surprised" by allegation). See generally Final
Report of Neal Batson, In re Enron Corp., No. 03 Civ. 1727 (LTS), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Batson Report] (discuss-
ing, in detail in Appendix C to Final Report, role of Enron's attorneys in certain of
Enron's SPE transactions and in Enron's disclosures concerning these transac-
tions); Indep. Exam'r Report, SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., No. 03C-1685, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17933 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2003).
[Vol. 49: p. 833
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 "to protect investors by improving the ac-
curacy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securi-
ties laws," and thus restore public confidence in the financial markets.
4
Although most of the Act focuses on improving the integrity and
timeliness of financial reporting, Section 307 directs the Commission to
issue rules "in the public interest and for the protection of investors, set-
ting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys ap-
pearing and practicing before the Commission." 5 Section 307 specifies
that these rules shall include a requirement that an attorney for a public
company must report evidence of a "material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation" up the ladder within the cor-
poration and, if necessary, to the board, the audit committee or another
committee composed of "independent" directors.6 Section 307 was Con-
gress's response to the question: "Where were the lawyers?"
II. ADOPTION OF PART 205 "UP-THE-LADDER" RULES
As directed by Section 307, the SEC adopted the Part 205 Rules, effec-
tive August 5, 2003, to provide for up-the-ladder reporting. 7 The Final
Rules also included provisions for permissive disclosure of client confi-
dences by attorneys in certain circumstances.
8
In general, the up-the-ladder reporting rules provide that when a law-
yer who is "appearing and practicing before the Commission" on behalf of
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 pmbl.
5. Id. § 307.
6. Id. The full text of Section 307 states:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Com-
mission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of
investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in
the representation of issuers, including a rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanc-
tions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the
evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or
to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of direc-
tors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of
directors.
Id.
7. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-3185.htm (noting that Section 307 requires SEC to
prescribe minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before Commission in any way in representation of issuers); see also 17
C.F.R. § 205.3(b), (c) (2004) (stating rules for up-the-ladder reporting).
8. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (stating rules of disclosure).
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an issuer "becomes aware" of credible evidence of a "material violation,"
the lawyer ordinarily must:
(1) report the evidence to the issuer's chief legal officer (CLO) or the
issuer's CLO and chief executive officer (CEO); and
(2) if the lawyer does not reasonably believe that the CLO or the CEO
has provided an appropriate response within a reasonable period of time,
then report the evidence to the audit committee or, if there is none, to a
board committee of independent directors or, if there is no applicable
committee, to the issuer's board of directors.9
The SEC permissive disclosure rules, much like ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.6(b) (2) and (3),10 allow an attorney representing
a public company to:
[R] eveal to the Commission. .. confidential information related
to the representation to the extent the attorney reasonably be-
lieves necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation
that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial inter-
est or property of the issuer or investors; . . .or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the
issuer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the
furtherance of which the attorney's services were used.1'
Observers have suggested that information which might have pre-
vented some of the recent corporate failures was not reported to the com-
panies' boards or even to the CEOs. Mandating lawyers to report up the
ladder to boards of directors when necessary helps ensure that boards do
receive and can act on evidence of material violations of which the com-
pany's lawyers have become aware.
Others have criticized the SEC's up-the-ladder reporting rules be-
cause they attempt to force public company lawyers to become "informa-
tion intermediaries" with the false notion that "mandated disclosure will
qualitatively increase information flow to corporate boards and to securi-
9. See id. § 205.3(b), (c) (setting forth process for attorney to report material
violations by issuer or by any officer, director, employee or agent of issuer). Under
the rules, if the lawyer believes reporting to the CLO and CEO would be futile (if,
for example, those officers are implicated in the violation), the lawyer may report
directly to the committee or board of directors. See id. § 205.3(b) (4) (stating dis-
closure rules for instances in which reporting to CLO and CEO are futile). Also, if
the issuer has a "qualified legal compliance committee," the lawyer may report
directly to that committee. See id. § 205.3(c) (explaining what lawyer should do
when issuer had qualified legal compliance committee).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004), available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc-toc.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). For a further
discussion of the exceptions to confidentiality provided in Rule 1.6(b), added to
the Model Rules in August 2003, see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
11. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2).
836 [Vol. 49: p. 833
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ties markets."12 A better approach, they say, would be to provide incen-
tives to board members and managers to seek additional guidance,
information and advice from their advisers, including lawyers. 13
Those who criticize the SEC's up-the-ladder rules also are concerned
that the rules will cause company employees to limit the information their
lawyers should have in order to counsel the company properly. This
might occur because public company lawyers must report material viola-
tions up the ladder even in matters totally removed from their representa-
tion of the client. Thus, lawyers could be deprived of information they
need to properly advise the client.
Despite these criticisms and continuing concern over their breadth,
interpretive uncertainty and highly rigid structure, the up-the-ladder rules
have found general acceptance among lawyers and their company clients.
This is because the rules do not depart significantly from prevailing state
ethics standards and are recognized as having accomplished some clear
benefits.1 4
12. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing
Future Enrons?, 48 ViL. L. REV. 1097, 1101, 1112-13 (2003) (noting value of report-
ing up). Fisch and Rosen make the point that directors at Enron had information
regarding many of the transactions. See id. at 1116-23 (describing ties of Enron
directors). According to Fisch and Rosen, not only did the directors not question
the transactions' legitimacy, they in fact approved the transactions, including waiv-
ers of the company's ethics code when necessary to permit its CFO to participate in
at least one of the special purpose entities. See id. at 1119 n.85 (addressing multi-
ple waivers of Enron's code of conduct).
13. See id. at 1097-98, 1131-33 (stating demand side approach to reform).
Fisch and Rosen argue that Section 307 of the Act would have had little impact on
the conduct of the lawyers most closely advising the Enron board because the di-
rectors already knew the risks involved in many transactions the board approved;
no one had shown, moreover, that the lawyers were aware of evidence that com-
pany principals were engaged in fraudulent conduct; and in any subsequent simi-
lar situation, lawyers likely will lack credible evidence of a material violation that
corporate officials refuse to remedy, or the lawyers will be complicit in the fraud.
See id. at 1114-17 (noting applicability of Section 307 to Enron). The authors ar-
gue that in either case the lawyers will have nothing to report, and in the latter
case, i.e., if the lawyers are complicit in the fraud, the lawyers can be sanctioned by
the SEC and subjected to civil and, possibly, criminal liability, "rendering the addi-
tional threat posed by Section 307 inconsequential." Id. at 1117 (noting potential
inefficacy of reporting-up provisions); see also Batson Report, supra note 3.
14. The up-the-ladder reporting standards are only slightly broader than ABA
Model Rule 1.13 provisions and, although somewhat ambiguous and rigid, are less
intrusive on the client-lawyer relationship than the rules the SEC originally pro-
posed in November 2002. In its April 2, 2003 Comment Letter to the Commission,
the ABA noted the clarifications necessary for the Final Rules to operate effec-
tively. See ABA Letter of Apr. 2, 2003, supra note 2, at 10-12. For example, the duty
to report evidence of a material violation up the ladder ought to be based on
"information relating to the representation" of the company as it is in ABA Model
Rule 1.13.
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III. PROPOSED MANDATORY WITHDRAWAL RULES
As noted above, the SEC has addressed reporting out by permitting
lawyers to report evidence of serious client crimes to the SEC, notwith-
standing any inconsistent state rules. This permissive reporting rule re-
sembles exceptions in the ABA Model Rules and lawyer conduct rules that
apply in all but eight states. Nevertheless, the Commission continues to
consider additional rules that would increase the obligations of lawyers far
beyond reporting up the ladder and permissive reporting outside of the
company. The rules currently being considered might force lawyers to
inform against their own clients.
Since their proposal last November, the Commission continues to
consider rules that would require a lawyer, if (1) after reporting evidence
of a material violation up the ladder the lawyer fails to receive an "appro-
priate response" within a reasonable time, and (2) the lawyer reasonably
believes that a material violation is ongoing or about to occur and is likely
to result in substantial injury to the financial interest of the company or
investors, to withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer based on
"professional considerations," so notify the company and, within one busi-
ness day, also notify the Commission and promptly disaffirm to the Com-
mission any materially false or misleading document or representation. 15
Most of those commenting on the November 2002 proposal described
serious problems with the so-called "noisy withdrawal." 16 In response, the
Commission proposed for consideration, along with noisy withdrawal, an
15. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (1) (defining standards of conduct); Implementa-
tion of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Release No. 33-8185, 68
Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (explaining that in-house employed lawyers
would be excused from mandatory withdrawal but must cease working on particu-
lar matter).
16. See generally SEC, Comments on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.
shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (providing comment letters on all proposed and
final Part 205 Rules). Nearly all object to the noisy withdrawal proposal. For ex-
ample, the letter signed by former SEC Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman on
behalf of himself and other prominent securities lawyers objects to mandatory
noisy withdrawal as "substituting the lawyer's legal judgment (on, for example, ma-
teriality) for that of the client's chief internal reviewing officer or organ and
equally substituting the lawyer's business judgment.., for that of the client's audit
committee or its board of directors." Letter from Edward Fleischman, former SEC
Commissioner, to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 25, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/ehfleischmanl.htm. The let-
ter argues against impairment of "public company lawyers' willingness to render
independent legal advice on [matters of compliance and disclosure on novel issues
that may disagree with SEC views] and to afford independent legal advice in those
matters and to afford independent legal representation in those contexts." Id.
Among those supporting the concept of noisy withdrawal were forty law professors,
most of whom in March 2002joined in a letter urging the SEC to mandate up-the-
ladder reporting within the company. See, e.g., Letter from Susan Koniak et al., to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/skoniakl.htm (stating reasons for advocating
noisy withdrawal).
[Vol. 49: p. 833
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alternative that would require the lawyer to withdraw in circumstances sim-
ilar to those just described. Under the alternative, the company (rather
than the reporting lawyer) would have to publicly report the lawyer's with-
drawal from representing the company for "professional
considerations." 
1 7
This alternative would not, however, eliminate the fundamental pol-
icy concerns regarding harm to the client-lawyer relationship and interfer-
ence with effective corporate governance. Mandating lawyer withdrawal
would still deny lawyers the flexibility they need to counsel clients effec-
tively on compliance with complex securities laws. It would, for example,
encourage lawyers to withdraw prematurely, rather than continue to coun-
sel legal compliance regarding difficult issues, when companies most need
17. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Release No. 33-8186 (Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/
33-8186.htm [hereinafter January 2003 Proposed Rules] ("Requiring issuers to re-
port attorney withdrawals in a public filing with the Commission may also provide
protection to investors by alerting them to the possibility of ongoing material viola-
tions by issuers."). The Commission also extended until April 7, 2003, the time for
commenting on the mandatory noisy withdrawal provisions. See id. at 6-10. Pro-
posed alternative § 205.3(d) (1) sets forth the lawyer's reporting-out requirement:
(d) Actions required where there is no appropriate response within a
reasonable time.
(1) Where an attorney who has reported evidence of a material vio-
lation under paragraph (b) of this section rather than paragraph
(c) of this section (i) does not receive an appropriate response,
or has not received an appropriate response in a reasonable
time, and (ii) has followed the procedures set forth in paragraph
(b) (3) of this section, and (iii) reasonably concludes that there
is substantial evidence of a material violation that is ongoing or
about to occur and is likely to cause substantial injury to the fi-
nancial interest or property of the issuer or of investors:
(A) An attorney retained by the issuer shall withdraw from rep-
resenting the issuer, and shall notify the issuer, in writing,
that the withdrawal is based on professional considerations.
(B) An attorney employed by the issuer shall cease forthwith any
participation or assistance ih any matter concerning the vio-
lation and shall notify the issuer, in writing, that he or she
believes that the issuer has not provided an appropriate re-
sponse in a reasonable time to his or her report of evidence
of a material violation under paragraph (b) of this section.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6324, 6328 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (explain-
ing duties of attorneys when company does not respond to evidence of violation).
Proposed Section 205.3(e) provides the company's reporting-out requirement:
(e) Duties of an issuer where an attorney has given notice pursuant to
paragraph (d).
(1) Where an attorney has provided an issuer with a written notice
pursuant to paragraph (d) (1), (d) (2), or (d) (3) of this section,
the issuer shall, within two business days of receipt of such writ-
ten notice, report such notice and the circumstances related
thereto on Form 8-K, 20-F, or 40-F, as applicable.
Id. at 6329 (requiring company to file with Commissioner when attorney has
withdrawn).
2004]
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the lawyer's advice. If the lawyer withdraws prematurely, the damage to
the company and its stockholders could have serious adverse conse-
quences. 18 Even worse, because of the serious consequences that would
flow from identifying a possible material violation, a mandatory withdrawal
requirement might prompt some lawyers to avoid asking the hard ques-
tions that enable them to counsel legal compliance.
Requiring that the lawyer withdraw followed by immediate mandatory
reporting by the company could, in addition, severely damage companies
and their investors through public disclosure of a withdrawal that might
have been unwarranted. The company's board might feel forced to dis-
close damaging information, despite justifiably believing that no material
violation has occurred, solely to avoid the lawyer's withdrawal, a public
report of the lawyer's withdrawal and the consequences of these events,
i.e., a full-scale SEC investigation and a private class action lawsuit. Many
feel that creating such a situation is not in the public interest.
While an SEC mandatory noisy withdrawal requirement might make a
difference in the rare situation in which it would be invoked, the mere
existence of such a requirement going beyond traditional lawyer obliga-
tions would likely make clients reluctant to confide in their lawyers, and it
may cause lawyers to avoid asking hard questions or to withdraw prema-
turely. For these and other reasons, it seems clear to many that either of
the SEC's pending proposals would be more likely to harm than protect
companies and their investors. 19
18. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Morgan, Professor, George Washington Uni-
versity Law School, to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 17, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/tdmorganl.htm (opining
that attorney disclosure to client company or CLO does not violate attorney-client
privilege, while reporting outside corporation may result in injury to corporation
and shareholders); ABA Letter of Apr. 2, 2003, supra note 2, at 4-8 (citing negative
effects of withdrawal as including destroying client trust in attorneys, clients avoid-
ing consultation with attorneys, premature withdrawal of attorneys and risk of de-
struction of market value of company's securities). Premature withdrawal risks suit
by the company against the attorney for allegedly withdrawing in breach of the
attorney's duty of loyalty to the client. To be sure, Section 205.6(c) purports to
exonerate an attorney from disciplinary or other liability under inconsistent state
standards when the attorney complies in good faith with the Part 205 Rules. See
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296-6301, 6323 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (es-
tablishing sanctions and discipline for attorneys). Section 205.1 also provides that
where state standards conflict with the Commission's rules, the latter shall govern,
but that ajurisdiction may impose additional obligations that are not inconsistent
with the Commission's standards. See id. at 6319 (establishing minimum standards
for attorney conduct, but allowing states to supplement, not override such stan-
dards). Nevertheless, in the absence of a definitive judicial determination, the ef-
fectiveness of the Commission's attempt to preempt state standards is uncertain.
See ABA Letter of Dec. 18, 2002, supra note 2, at 31-34 (discussing legal challenges
to this issue). For a further discussion of the legal challenges to this issue, see infra
Part V.
19. In this respect, the pending standards for lawyer conduct would not be "in
the public interest and for the protection of investors," as Section 307 requires. See
[Vol. 49: p. 833
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IV. DEVIATIONS FROM TRADITIONAL LAWYER DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
Manifestly, an SEC mandated noisy withdrawal rule would deviate
from traditional lawyer obligations and set up direct conflicts of interest
with the lawyer's primary duty of loyalty to the company client. Mandatory
noisy withdrawal also would establish a federal legal standard in sharp con-
flict with rules of professional conduct applicable in virtually every state,
thus creating serious dilemmas for lawyers regarding which standards to
follow. 20 No state rule requires, as would the Commission's proposal, that
a lawyer withdraw from representing the client merely because (1) an "ap-
propriate response" 2 1 to reported evidence of a material violation of se-
curities laws is not received within a reasonable time and (2) there is
merely a "likelihood" (as opposed to reasonable certainty or clear proof)
that financial injury to others will occur, and without such violation bear-
ing any relationship to the representation or the lawyer's rendering of
services.
When representing a client as an adviser, the lawyer's main function
is to provide the client with an informed understanding of the client's
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 768 (2002) (defin-
ing standards for attorneys appearing before Commission).
20. Even where reporting to prevent a crime is mandatory, the clearest evi-
dence is required. See, e.g., VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (1) cmt. 13
(2004), available at http://www.vsb.org/profguides/rules.pdf (requiring
mandatory reporting when client states intention to commit crime); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2004) (stating that lawyer may dis-
close confidential information to "prevent the client from committing a crime or
fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is
using the lawyer's services," or to prevent, mitigate or rectify such substantial in-jury); REPORT OF ABA TASK FORCE ON CORPORAT RESPONSIBILITY 48-50, 50 n.89
(Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.acca.com/public/policy/corpresp/aba.
pdf [hereinafter ABA CoRPoRATE RESPONSIBiLrrv REPORT] (describing state disclo-
sure rules).
21. Some of the quoted terms are defined or explained in the Part 205 Rules,
supra note 6. For example, Proposed Rule 205.2(b) provides that an "appropriate
response" is a response, as a result of which, the attorney reasonably believes (i) no
material violation has occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur; or (ii) the com-
pany has adopted appropriate remedial measures to stop or prevent any material
violation or minimize the likelihood of recurrence; or (iii) the company, with
board approval, directed an attorney to review the evidence, has substantially im-
plemented remedial recommendations made by the attorney after investigation or
has been advised by the attorney that a colorable defense may be asserted in any
investigation or proceeding. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Con-
duct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified in 17
C.F.R. pt. 205) (calling for consideration of attorney's evaluation, issuer's response
and material evidence). "Reasonable or reasonably" means conduct that would
not be unreasonable for a prudent and competent attorney. See id. (defining
term). "Reasonably believes" means that an attorney believes the matter in ques-
tion and that the circumstances are such that the belief is not unreasonable. See id.
(same).
2004]
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legal rights and obligations and to explain their practical implications. 22
Therefore, reporting within the company up the ladder to the board of
directors, if necessary, is appropriate to fulfill the lawyer's obligation to
protect the corporation because the board has the ultimate responsibility
to take appropriate action on behalf of the company. 23 Once the lawyer
makes a recommendation to the company's board, however, those offi-
cials-and not the lawyer-should make the ultimate decisions.
2 4
Of course, when a lawyer knows the lawyer's services are being or will
be used to assist the client in a crime or fraud, the lawyer must terminate
assistance and, if necessary, withdraw from representing the client.
25
When it becomes clear, for example, that a client is using its lawyer's ser-
vices to make loans from banks based upon the security of fake equipment
leases, the lawyer who continues to assist at closings not only would violate
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2004) (stating that as
adviser "a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's
legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications"); see also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 375 (1993) (stating that
lawyer assisting client in regulatory matter must not lie to or mislead agency or
assist client's fraud, but has no duty to reveal confidential information protected
under Rule 1.6 and does not assume client's legal disclosure obligations at least so
long as agency continues to have access to client and its employees); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) (explaining that in
providing tax shelter opinion, lawyer, inter alia, must not accept as true any facts
lawyer reasonably should know further inquiry would prove untrue, but has no
duty to "audit" client's affairs); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAw GovERNING LAWYERS
§ 95 cmt. c (2000) (noting that lawyer undertaking evaluation at request of client
for benefit of third person owes that person duty to be fair and objective, but
absent express undertaking does not guarantee accuracy of facts stated).
23. See generally ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 20 (ex-
plaining obligations of lawyers). An enhanced role for lawyers is advocated in or-
der to diminish the occurrence of material violations of law. See id. at 34-61
(advocating methods to facilitate more communication between lawyers and cor-
porations). This report also establishes nine general practices for improving cor-
porate responsibility. See id. at 62-73 (suggesting means to improve effectiveness of
boards of directors). Measures recommended by the Corporate Responsibility
Task Force and adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates in August 2003 (House
Reports 119A, 119B and 119C) effectively balance the need of corporate managers
to exchange information with their lawyers and to receive and act upon lawyers'
advice with the responsibility of lawyers to help achieve legal compliance, includ-
ing permission to report outside the corporation in certain circumstances when all
other measures fail. See id. (same).
24. To illustrate, suppose that the independent directors, after being in-
formed of the anticipated loss of a major customer and counsel's view that this
circumstance needs to be disclosed in an impending SEC filing, determine to with-
hold that disclosure based on the prospects for retaining or replacing that cus-
tomer and the irreparable harm that would be caused the company if the
disclosure were made out of context. The lawyer should not be put in the position
of substituting the lawyer's judgment for that of the directors in this situation.
25. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (2004) (stating that "a
lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall
withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law").
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ethical obligations, 26 but would engage in illegal and possibly criminal
conduct.
Under traditional standards, such as ABA Model Rule 1.6(b) 27 and
the ALI's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Section 67,28 when a
26. See id. (stating that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent").
27. See id. (stating exceptions to client confidentiality). Specifically, these ex-
ceptions are as follows:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to re-
sult or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's
services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these
Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a con-
troversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allega-
tions in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation
of the client; or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
Id.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 (2000). Section
67 provides:
§ 67. Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent, Rectify, or Mitigate
Substantial Financial Loss.
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when
the lawyer reasonably believes that its use or disclosure is necessary to
prevent a crime or fraud, and:
(a) the crime or fraud threatens substantial financial loss;
(b) the loss has not yet occurred;
(c) the lawyer's client intends to commit the crime or fraud either
personally or through a third person; and
(d) the client has employed or is employing the lawyer's services in
the matter in which the crime or fraud is committed.
(2) If a crime or fraud described in Subsection (1) has already occurred,
a lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when the
lawyer reasonably believes its use or disclosure is necessary to pre-
vent, rectify, or mitigate the loss.
(3) Before using or disclosing information under this Section, the lawyer
must, if feasible, make a good-faith effort to persuade the client not
to act. If the client or another person has already acted, the lawyer
must, if feasible, advise the client to warn the victim or to take other
action to prevent, rectify, or mitigate the loss. The lawyer must, if
feasible, also advise the client of the lawyer's ability to use or disclose
information as provided in this Section and the consequences
thereof.
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lawyer learns a client is using the lawyer's services to commit a fraud, the
lawyer has discretion to reveal client information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the crime or fraud when it is
"reasonably certain" to result in substantial financial loss to another, and
(2) to prevent, mitigate or rectify the substantial financial loss when it is
reasonably certain to result or has occurred.
These traditional standards, substantially similar to the SEC's Part 205
Rules that provide for permissive reporting out, allow lawyers sufficient
flexibility to dissuade clients from criminal or fraudulent activities where
the lawyer is likely to be implicated and, if that fails, to protect innocent
third parties against substantial financial injury, as well as avoid personal
liability themselves. Moreover, the SEC previously has indicated in In re
Carter29 that the best way to ensure compliance is to encourage lawyers to
continue counseling clients to comply with the law, rather than to provide
incentives for withdrawing prematurely because of concern for their own
liability.3 0 In re Carter recognized that, short of assisting fraud, a lawyer's
continuing to counsel compliance with the law serves both the public in-
terest and the interests of the company and its investors.
(4) A lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted
under this Section is not, solely by reason of such action or inaction,
subject to professional discipline, liable for damages to the lawyer's
client or any third person, or barred from recovery against a client or
third person.
Id. These exceptions closely resemble the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege, although the latter generally is applied by court decision. See id.§§ 67 cmt. c, 82 cmt. d (noting similarity to crime-fraud exceptions); GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & W. WiLAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWERING § 9.10 (3d ed. & 2003
Supp.) (explaining crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege).
29. 47 S.E.C. 471, 512 (1981), 1981 SEC LEXIS 1940 ("Premature resignation
serves neither the end of an effective lawyer-client relationship nor, in most cases,
the effective administration of the securities laws.").
30. See id. (supporting continued counseling role). A lawyer's concern about
the lawyer's own liability when advising a client on a close question whether to
disclose significant detrimental information or not can, as recognized in In re
Carter, alter the balance of the lawyer's professional judgment just as surely as sub-
servience to the wishes of clients. See id. at 504 (stating how concern about liability
can alter decision to disclose just as likely as "unseemly obeisance" to wishes of
client). It serves no public purpose to disclose nonmaterial information, adverse
though it may be, or to encourage the timid to withdraw from representing a client
with the belief the lawyer could be charged with assisting in a fraud "just to be
safe." See id. (stating that neither result is truly in public's interest). Moreover,
securities law concepts such as whether a matter is material or information consti-
tutes evidence of a securities law violation or breach of fiduciary duty are complex
and all the facts rarely are known when decisions need to be made. These practi-
cal considerations are given no weight by those who urge adoption of noisy with-
drawal. See, e.g., Letter from Susan P. Koniak et al., to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/lawprofs040703.htm (listing academics in general agreement).
[Vol. 49: p. 833
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V. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO ,PART 205 RULES
Two state bar associations are already challenging the SEC's authority
to preempt conflicting state professional conduct rules that prohibit dis-
closure of client confidences. The Part 205 Rules flatly state: "Where the
standards of a state or other United States jurisdiction where an attorney is
admitted or practices conflict with this Part, this Part shall govern." 3 1 In
order to protect lawyers who comply with the Part 205 Rules, they also
provide:
An attorney who complies in good faith with the provisions of
this Part shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise liable
under inconsistent standards imposed by any state or other
United States jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted or
practices. 32
Nevertheless, in a recent ethics opinion, the Washington State Bar
Association warned Washington lawyers against disclosing client informa-
tion when it is permitted under the Part 205 Rules, but prohibited by the
state's rules.3 3 Accordingly, the SEC's safe harbor for good faith compli-
ance with the Part 205 Rules might not protect a lawyer from state disci-
pline for disclosing client confidences when the state's Rule 1.6 prohibits
such disclosure.
In response, SEC General Counsel Prezioso, on behalf of the Com-
mission, in a public letter to the Washington State Bar, has asserted the
authority of the SEC under the Act to preempt conflicting state standards,
including a state's rules that would discourage lawyers from making a dis-
closure that is permitted under the SEC's Part 205 Rules. 34
A committee of the California State Bar Business Law Section also has
taken issue with the Commission and asserted that California has an obli-
gation, notwithstanding the Part 205 Rules, to enforce its near absolute
31. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practic-
ing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.1
(2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
32. Id. § 205.6(c).
33. See WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N, INTERIM FoRmAL ETHICS OPINION RE:
THE EFFECT OF THE SEC's SARBANES-OxLEY REGULATIONS ON WASHINGTON ATrOR-
NENS' OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE RPCs (July 26, 2003), available at http://www.wsba.
org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/formalopinion.doc (cautioning that lawyer in
Washington should not disclose "confidences and secrets" permitted to be dis-
closed under Section 205 where such disclosure is not permitted by RPC
1.6(b) (1)); see also Sue Reisinger, Two State Bars Protest SEC Rule, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
15, 2003, at 1 (explaining that State of Washington only allows disclosure to pre-
vent client from committing crime or pursuant to court order).
34. See Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, Securities and Ex-
change Commission, to Washington State Bar Association (July 23, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm (stating in publicly re-
leased letter that Supreme Court has consistently upheld authority of federal agen-
cies to implement rules of conduct that diverge from and supercede state laws that
address same conflict).
2004]
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prohibition of lawyers disclosing client confidences because "it is unclear
whether the SEC had the authority to adopt Rules 205.3(d) and 205.6(c)
[authorizing lawyers to disclose material violations and protecting them
from state discipline] or that either of those rules preempts state laws."'35
How will this controversy be resolved? One legal scholar, comment-
ing on earlier allegations that the SEC lacks this authority, has asserted:
"[A] claim that the SEC's noisy withdrawal proposal exceeds legislative in-
tent is clearly misplaced" because it "erroneously suggests that Section 307
set forth maximum rather than minimum standards ... [and] thus misses
the mark based on the clear language of the statute and the absence of
any legislative intent to the contrary."
36
This comment appears to overstate both the clarity of Section 307 and
the absence of legislative intent under Section 307 that it not obligate law-
yers to report outside the company. Senator Edwards of North Carolina,
principal sponsor of Section 307, when responding to questions by Bank-
ing Committee Chair Sarbanes during debate on the Act, stated that Sec-
tion 307 would not obligate lawyers to report anything outside the
company.3 7 Senator Enzi of Wyoming, another sponsor, also commented:
35. CoRPs. COMM., Bus. LAw SECTION, STATE BAR OF CALIF., COMMENT ON JULY
23, 2003 PUBLIC STATEMENT BY SEC OFFICIAL (Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://
www.ethicsandlawyering.com/issues/files/calseclettertosec.pdf (noting that pro-
tection of client confidences is essential to legal system and that disclosure of client
confidences could adversely affect both client and attorney).
36. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Administrative Law Controls on Attorney Practice-A
Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission's Lawyer Conduct Rules, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 323, 34849 (2003) (responding to criticism of SEC's noisy withdrawal propo-
sal as outside scope of statutory mandate of Section 307). "Congress could
have ... define[d] proper legal representation rather than deferr[ing] to the
SEC .... Congress followed a pattern that is familiar under many provisions of the
securities laws .. . [by setting] a minimum standard but allow[ing] the SEC to
define the eventual standard more broadly." Id. at 349 n.131.
37. See 148 CONG. REC. S6557 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Ed-
wards). Senator John Edwards (D-NC) offered Section 307 as an amendment to
the then pending corporate responsibility legislation. See id. (offering amend-
ment). Section 307 was in response to SEC General Counsel David Becker's sug-
gestion of the need for legislation in order to authorize a Commission rule
requiring lawyers to report misconduct up the ladder within the company client.
See Letter from David Becker, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, to Richard W. Painter, Professor, University of Illinois College of Law (Mar.
28, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/
becker.pdf (responding to Professor Painter's question whether lawyers should
have heightened responsibilities for reporting violations of securities laws). Dur-
ing Senate debate on the Edwards Amendment, the following explanatory collo-
quy occurred between Senator Edwards and Committee Chair Paul Sarbanes (D-
MD):
MR. SARBANES. It is my understanding that this amendment, which
places responsibility upon the lawyer for the corporation to report up the
ladder, only involves going up within the corporate structure. He doesn't
go outside of the corporate structure. So the lawyer would first go to the
chief legal officer, or the chief executive officer, and if he didn't get an
appropriate response, he would go to the board of directors. Is that
correct?
846 [Vol. 49: p. 833
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"The [Edwards] [A]mendment ... would not require the attorneys to re-
port violations to the SEC, only to corporate legal counsel or the CEO,
and ultimately, to the board of directors. '3 8 Based on these assertions and
other factors, a court might hold that the SEC lacks authority under Sec-
tion 307 to require lawyers to report outside the company. Until these
issues are resolved, however, it is in both the public interest and the inter-
est of affected lawyers for state authorities to take a no-action position with
respect to lawyers who report material violations outside the company in
good faith reliance upon SEC rules.
VI. AN APPROPRIATE REGULATORY RESPONSE
In our judgment, the fundamental issue to be confronted in address-
ing the SEC's pending mandatory noisy withdrawal proposal (whether re-
porting the lawyer's withdrawal is by the lawyer or the company) is
whether a compelling justification exists for so significant a change in the
client-lawyer relationship. We agree with those who say that mandating
disclosures of confidences and threatening to impose sanctions on lawyers
would interfere with client access to effective and independent legal coun-
sel and impede the ability of lawyers to counsel compliance. Undeniably,
the client-lawyer relationship is dependent upon the client's assurance
that its communications with its lawyer will remain confidential and that
the lawyer is dedicated to the client's best interests, unfettered by self-in-
terest or other conflicts. Not only would mandatory withdrawal and disclo-
sure interfere with the client-lawyer relationship, it would inevitably
impair the ability of company boards to make crucial business decisions
when the lawyers are required to substitute their judgment for the board's.
MR. EDWARDS. Mr. President, my response to the question is the only
obligation that this amendment creates is the obligation to report to the
client, which begins with the chief legal officer, and, if that is unsuccess-
ful, then to the board of the corporation. There is no obligation to re-
port anything outside the client-the corporation.
MR. SARBANES. I think that is an important point. I simply asked the
question in order to stress the fact that that is the way this amendment
works. This has been a very carefully worked out amendment ....
148 CONG. REC. S6557.
38. 148 CONG. REc. S6555 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
More recently, Chairman Oxley of the House Committee on Financial Services
filed an opening statement on the issue at hearings held on February 4, 2004 by
the Subcommittee on Capital Markets on "The Role of Attorneys in Corporate
Governance." In it, he noted:
This attorney misconduct led to a legislative remedy in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act requiring attorneys to report securities law violations "up the
ladder" to the general counsel and chief executive officer, and if neces-
sary the board of directors. While the SEC has implemented this sensible
requirement as set forth in the Act, the Commission clearly went beyond
congressional intent in proposing the noisy withdrawal mandate, but has
since scaled back the provision.
150 CONG. REc. D56 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2004) (statement of Sen. Oxley).
2004]
15
Moser and Keller: Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or Informers
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
The foregoing values inherent in the traditional relationship between
clients and their lawyers are, of course, not absolute. They are subject to
exceptions to accommodate competing considerations, such as the desira-
bility to avoid frauds that will cause substantial harm. But these exceptions
under state legal ethics rules are carefully tailored to minimize harm to
the core values underlying the client-lawyer relationship. Thus, for exam-
ple, the exceptions to confidentiality usually are permissive, allowing the
lawyer to exercise professional judgment based on the circumstances. 39
The exception for client fraud also may be limited to situations where the
client uses the lawyer's services to commit the fraud. Ultimately, the right
balance must be attained in the face of competing values.
Public policy requires that extreme caution be exercised before put-
ting in jeopardy core values such as access to counsel and the ability of
boards to make business decisions. Furthermore, those seeking to dis-
place these core values should bear the burden of satisfactorily rebutting
the following observations:
(1). There is no compelling justification for taking the risk inherent in an SEC
noisy withdrawal rule.
It seems clear that SEC mandated noisy withdrawal is likely to apply
only to the rarest of cases. Irrevocable damage to the client-lawyer rela-
tionship, however, is likely to apply broadly by virtue of the mere existence
of the noisy withdrawal requirement. Sufficient leverage to achieve corpo-
rate compliance is already afforded lawyers through permissive reporting
out, but without as much disruptive impact on the client-lawyer relation-
ship as would result from a mandatory requirement. 40 The client knows
permissive reporting allows its lawyer to exercise professional judgment
taking into account all the circumstances without being concerned
whether remaining as its lawyer in order to counsel compliance will result
in charges against the lawyer.
(2). An SEC noisy withdrawal rule is likely to have the adverse consequences
we describe.
39. For a discussion of the disclosure standards for lawyers advising clients,
see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the stan-
dard in the SEC's Part 205 Rules, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
40. See Patrick McGeehan, Lauyers Take Suspicions on TVAzteca to Its Board, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at C1 (describing how Section 307 has recently been applied
to Mexico's second-largest television broadcaster). Lawyers for TV Azteca report-
edly applied the SEC's Part 205 Rules to persuade Azteca's independent directors
to investigate the adequacy of disclosure of its executive officer's dealings in Az-
teca's debt instruments. See id. (reporting lawyers' actions). Steven H. Scheinman
of Akin Gump's New York office wrote the affected boards of directors that the
firm had withdrawn from representing Azteca because, in the firm's opinion, cer-
tain transactions that the chief executive officer and the general counsel decided
not to disclose were required to be disclosed pursuant to U.S. securities law. See id.
(noting letter). Citing Section 307 of the Act, Mr. Scheinman reserved the right to
inform the SEC of the firm's withdrawal from the representation. See id. (noting
reservation).
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No one can prove empirically that these adverse consequences will
occur. Rather, it is a judgment based on our experience as counselors.
But neither can the proponents of mandatory noisy withdrawal prove that
the consequences will not occur. And they are the ones who should bear
the burden when putting the core values in jeopardy. What is certain is
that requiring lawyers to take action when they disagree with their clients
or face sanctions for violating the law will inevitably shift the balance of
decisionmaking from the directors charged with that responsibility to the
company's lawyers, including when complex judgments, such as decisions
regarding materiality, are involved.
(3). An SEC noisy withdrawal rule will reduce rather than promote overall
legal compliance.
There may be an occasional case in which a lawyer's report to the SEC
prevents a violation that would otherwise have occurred. But, in our judg-
ment, these instances will be greatly exceeded by the numerous times law-
yers are prevented from counseling clients on legal compliance because
they are denied access to the relevant information as a consequence of
mandated withdrawal. It is important to bear in mind that the U.S. securi-
ties regulatory system is largely a self-regulatory system that depends on
the key role played by lawyers to enhance compliance. The valiant efforts
of government enforcement staff and the check afforded by civil litigants
provides only after-the-fact punishment in a few cases after the damage has
been done. This should be compared to the effect of before-the-fact coun-
seling that lawyers regularly perform.
(4). Other measures that have been put in place to ensure corporate legal com-
pliance will adequately address the problem.
These other measures include: (1) the recently adopted SEC Part 205
reporting-up rules, (2) the ABA's enhancement of the Model Rules, as
described above, (3) the SEC's effort to override inconsistent state rules
that would prevent permissive reporting out, (4) the substantial efforts of
law firms and law departments to put procedures in place to implement
professional conduct rules, including those adopted by the SEC, (5) the
enhancements in corporate governance that both encourage greater vigi-
lance and oversight by independent directors and their committees and
ensure that there is an effective body to address reports received from
lawyers, and (6) the expanded responsibilities to police compliance im-
posed on others, such as outside auditors, who do not have the same du-
ties and responsibilities to clients that lawyers do. We believe these
measures should be given the opportunity to operate effectively before the
Commission makes its decision whether to adopt a mandatory noisy with-
drawal rule that could interfere with the client-lawyer relationship, im-
pede lawyers' ability to counsel compliance and impair the ability of
boards to make ultimate business judgments.
2004] 849
17
Moser and Keller: Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or Informers
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VII. CONCLUSION
Many have suggested to the Commission that the up-the-ladder re-
porting requirements and permissive reporting-out provisions in the Part
205 Rules go far enough in enhancing the lawyer's role in corporate gov-
ernance. The ABA and others have urged the SEC not to issue further
rules for the present so that the effectiveness of the current Part 205 Rules,
in combination with the other new corporate responsibility and account-
ing regulations, can be assessed. 4 1 Already, the active focus of company
boards, management and advisers on improving corporate responsibility
and complying with the letter and spirit of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is help-
ing restore public confidence in the financial markets.
In the not too distant future, the Commission is expected to tell us
whether it agrees.
41. See ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 20, at 6-10 (sum-
marizing recent reforms affecting corporate responsibility and asserting that SEC
should not promulgate further rules until effectiveness of Section 205 has had
chance to be effective). By reporting up the ladder, lawyers are already effectively
causing independent directors to investigate management's failure to publicly dis-
close information believed by the lawyers to be material. See McGeehan, supra note
40, at C1 (providing example of up-the-ladder reporting rules' effect on disclosure
of public information).
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